

Phase 3 Individual Project

John Muscarnero

Colorado Technical University

Homeland Security Enterprise

HLS870-1402-02

Dr. Michael Hummel

May 18, 2014

Copyrighted Material - © 2014 John Muscarnero II

Phase 3 Individual Project

Introduction

The authors point out when it comes to counterinsurgency (COIN), it is important to note as much information community data that may come from internal sources (Sewall et al., 2007). Social and ethnic exchanges enhances the ability to fight and even prevent activities that could be of a terrorist origin. In order to gain this trust, pre-exchanges of information can go a long way. It begins with earning the trust of leaders who only want to live in peace. The practice of their religious faith should not be an impediment for an enforcement of legitimate actions.

The word intelligence at least in planning COIN, is the understanding of the operational environment, knowing the local populace, host country, new and existing insurgents. In operating counterinsurgencies the intelligence must be procured through human sources-human intelligence (Mumm, 2012). Planning should always provide a strategy for success. Without good solid and reliable information, failure is inevitable.

Conducting COIN Intelligence Gathering in the Local Community.

“Finally, Mumm also stated that [current military organizations] conducting counterinsurgency operations lack the technological infrastructure to respond quickly to the demonstrated ability of extremists to respond quickly with information and misinformation” (as quoted by Himelfarb, 2010, p. 2). Successful counterinsurgency operations demand the sending out all event-driven news. The distribution of positive news or changing the effects of an event is dangerous to a strategy aimed at influencing not only ethnic cultures but also critical public opinion. Some military commands are void of knowing the complexities can thwart the terrorist’s social media over-reaching holdings.

Leadership Tasks and Counterinsurgency Operations.

The leadership tasks demand immediate action, for example, Williams (2012) stated that leaders and soldiers may face a daunting task on the ground in Afghanistan. The existing rules of engagement include the use of minimal self-defense when it comes to COIN. Military commanders have to use the existing conceptions in order to develop training curriculums that must meet or exceed the rules of engagement but also published and international counterinsurgency doctrines.

Conclusion

The relationship between counterinsurgency management and leadership tasks that must be used to fight back include many trained officers and enlisted skills adapted to the environment where terrorists may operate. Each leadership skill can enhance and be the defining factor for success. Whether it is in the battlefield of Afghanistan or Detroit's Muslim community, success depends on operational personnel knowing what data is relevant and which may be misinformation. Operational planning comes from that siphoning of knowledge. Remembering that terrorists look for a gap in the COIN strategy in order to strike next time.

References

Himelfarb, Sheldon. "Media and Peace building in Afghanistan." United States Institute of Peace-Peace Brief 15. March 20, 2010.

Mumm, N. (2012). Crowdsourcing: A New Perspective on Human Intelligence Collection in a Counterinsurgency. *Journal Article/ January, 3(3), 59pm.*

Sewall S. (2007). *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Williams, W. S. (2012). Training the Rules of Engagement for the Counterinsurgency Fight. *Army Law., 42.*

Copyrighted Material - @2014 John Muscarnero II